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1. A BIT OF PERSONAL HISTORY
Let me start with a confession: I feel responsible for the fact 
that Barry Smith is not a philosopher anymore. “I used to 
be a philosopher,” he keeps saying, “now I am an ontologist.” 
On the other hand, somewhat paradoxically, Barry is defi-
nitely responsible for the fact that (as some people say) I am 
not an engineer anymore, being irreversibly contaminated 
by philosophy.1
Everything started almost 30 years ago, in the late 1980s, 
when I was struggling with the knowledge representation 
problems of medical expert systems, working in the domain 
of arrhythmia management. Obviously, one of the first prob-
lems I had to face was the proper representation of parthood 
relations. At that time, knowledge representation systems 
were already affected by the belonging fallacy (Wilensky 
1987)—unfortunately still so frequent nowadays—which 
consists of aggregating together pieces of information (at-
tributes) that may somehow belong to a particular object, 
without being explicit about the nature of the attribute rela-
tionship (Guarino 1992). Yet the importance of an explicit, 
proper modeling of the parthood relation seemed to me of 
utmost importance, especially for the medical domain. So, 
I started reading everything I was able to find on that topic. 
Fortunately, the lab where I was working at that time, despite 
being mainly devoted to systems dynamics and biomedical 
engineering, had a pretty good library covering also cogni-
tive science and artificial intelligence, so I had the opportu-
nity to discover the seminal paper on part-whole relations by 
Winston, Chaffin, and Herrmann (1987), which was really 
illuminating to me. Among the references listed there, an 
obscure but intriguing title captured my attention: 
Parts and Moments: Studies in Logic and Formal 
Ontology, edited by Barry Smith (1982)
The financial status of CNR at that time was much better 
than the present miserable situation, so I managed to or-
der that expensive book. When I finally grabbed it, a whole 
new world opened up to me. The introduction “Pieces of 
a Theory” by Barry Smith and Kevin Mulligan (1982) was 
fascinating, although not an easy read for a person with an 
engineering background. In particular, what grabbed my at-
tention was the passionate defense of
an ontological approach to the problem of the a priori, 
—an approach which stands in opposition to the logi-
co-linguistic approach, inspired above all by Frege, 
which has come to be accepted as orthodoxy by Anglo-
Saxon philosophers (Smith and Mulligan 1982).
While reading these words, I realized that the very same 
contrast between the logico-linguistic approach and the on-
tological approach was manifesting itself in the knowledge 
representation literature, which in that period was sacrific-
ing expressivity in exchange of computational tractability. 
Stimulated by such discovery, I started a radical re-visitation 
of the literature, which ended up some years later in the 
proposal of a specific ontological level for knowledge repre-
sentation primitives (1994; 2009), contrasted with the episte-
mological level proposed by Brachman (1979).2












At the same time, I went on reading “The Formalization 
of Husserl’s Theory of Wholes and Parts,” published by Peter 
Simons in the same collection (1982), and then Simons’ book 
on parts (1987),  a milestone in my personal discovery of 
formal ontology. I guess it was through these readings that I 
became aware of the Center for the Study of Mitteleuropean 
Philosophy, led by Roberto Poli. I went to Trento to visit him 
in 1992, and in the following year we organized together 
the first International Workshop on Formal Ontology in 
Conceptual Analysis and Knowledge Representation, held 
in Padova in March 1993. This was the first interdisciplin-
ary conference on what is now called applied ontology. Barry 
Smith was an invited speaker, and we started cooperating. 
The following year, Barry invited me to the 1994 Wittgenstein 
symposium, organized by him (with Roberto Casati and 
Graham White) on the theme ‘Philosophy and the Cognitive 
Sciences.’ I presented there my first ideas on the ontological 
level, based on an ongoing work with Pierdaniele Giaretta 
and Massimiliano Carrara (1994). Then I relied a lot on his 
comments while writing my first journal paper defending 
“the systematic introduction of formal ontological principles 
in the current practice of knowledge engineering” (1995). In 
a few years, by the time of the Buffalo conference on Applied 
Ontology organized by Barry (1998), and the first conference 
on Formal Ontology in Information Systems held in Trento in 
June of the same year (Guarino 1998), the mutual contami-
nation was consummated.
2. BFO AND DOLCE
After this personal historical note, I would like to comment 
on some work Barry and I started several years after our 
mutual contamination, namely around 2001, when each of 
us was involved in a funded project concerning the devel-
opment of an upper level ontology: BFO and DOLCE were 
born more or less at the same time.3 Since the beginning, we 
had several occasions to interact and compare our approach-
es, but the two projects took different directions. After the 
two ontologies started being adopted worldwide, on several 
occasions4 we agreed in principle on the utility and impor-
tance of attempting some kind of alignment, but for various 
reasons the real work never started. Now, as a gift to Barry 
for this special occasion, I would like to briefly comment in 
this paper on the main differences and similarities between 
the two ontologies, suggesting some possible strategies for 
isolating a common core. At the same time, I will take this 
opportunity to comment on possible DOLCE extensions, 
adjustments or revisions whose need emerged in the past, at 
least in my view. Indeed, differently from BFO, which under-
went two main releases and was maintained more or less as a 
product, the original DOLCE axiomatization (unfortunately 
never published in an official academic venue) remained 
very stable over the years, except for a systematization of its 
core assumptions done by Borgo and Masolo (2009). Yet, I 
believe that a comparison with BFO may motivate a re-visi-
tation of some DOLCE choices.
While doing this comparison between the two ontolo-
gies, let me clarify immediately that I will not attempt here 
to enter into the realist/antirealist debate, which in the last 
years has been at the core of almost all discussions on BFO 
(Merrill 2010; Smith and Ceusters 2010). I must say that, al-
though contaminated with philosophy, I still have the soul 
of a pragmatic engineer, so I evaluate ontological choices on 
the basis of their actual utility, independently of any deep 
metaphysical doctrine. To me, ontologies are useful not 
only for the integration of scientific data, but more in gen-
eral for the integration of software systems and databases. 
To this purpose, the specific role of ontologies is to make 
explicit people’s assumptions about the domain of interest 
of software applications, independently of the metaphysi-
cal nature of such assumptions, and even independently of 
their scientific accuracy. In this perspective, the main utility 
criterion I adopt is based on language, namely on the degree 
an ontological distinction reflects a distinction in the way 
people talk of a particular domain. That’s why DOLCE takes 
a descriptive approach towards language, avoiding any deep 
metaphysical commitment. That said, I am convinced that 
many of the choices made by BFO may be useful under the 
DOLCE perspective, and vice versa.
2.1  Objects
While analyzing the basic notion of object, BFO and DOLCE 
took different directions from the beginning. Although both 
ontologies agree that objects are “endurants with unity,” 
DOLCE puts a lot of attention in characterizing the differ-
ences and the relationships between physical objects and 
amounts of matter, without investigating the notion of unity 
in detail, mainly because different subtypes of objects may 
have different unity criteria. BFO, on the contrary, adopts a 
common notion of causal unification and maximal self-con-
nection for all objects, and develops on this basis a sophisti-
cated theory of fiat parts, outer boundaries and sites. Letting 
aside a radical difference concerning DOLCE’s multiplica-
tive approach to deal with the relationship between objects 
and amounts of matter,5  this is certainly an area where some 
integration may be achieved, in the sense that some BFO 








axioms and definitions may be somehow incorporated in 
DOLCE, and efforts may be joined to further develop some 
useful notions which are still weakly characterized, such as 
the notion of a site.6 A lot of literature exists already on plac-
es, boundaries and topological unity, while in my opinion 
further unity criteria concerning morphological, functional, 
and social wholes might be considered. Also, a further anal-
ysis of the notion of causal unification defined in terms of 
relative movement might be particularly useful for the ontol-
ogy of mechanical assemblies, possibly in connection with 
the notion of degrees of freedom.7
2.2  Qualities, roles, and dispositions
The treatment of individual qualities is probably one of 
DOLCE’s most original contributions. The idea of distin-
guishing the intension of a term like the color of this rose 
from its actual extension, which may change at different 
times, was firm in my mind from my early work on knowl-
edge representation (Guarino 1991). The problem we faced 
with DOLCE was to reconcile this intuition with the notion 
of trope, which is similar but not identical: a standard exam-
ple of a trope is the particular color of this rose, or, in Barry 
Smith’s words, “the particular case of redness of a particular 
fly eye.” This means that tropes are classically understood as 
super-determinate particularized properties. Under this view, 
if the color of this rose denotes a trope, then the only way to 
account for a change in color is to admit a mechanism of 
trope replacement. But if a particular color is replaced by an-
other particular color, then sure, we can say that the rose has 
genuinely changed, but we cannot say that its color has genu-
inely changed! So, we decided to deal with this problem by 
postulating the existence of individual qualities as dependent 
particulars that abstract away from classic tropes, being able 
to genuinely change while “moving” within a quality space. 
Several years later, I discovered that Friederike Moltmann 
(2007; 2013) made a very similar choice while challenging 
the standard trope theory by taking inspiration from Fine’s 
powerful idea of variable embodiment, and treating trope-
referring terms like the color of this rose or the temperature 
of this room as variable tropes, i.e., variable embodiments of 
standard tropes. In a recent paper with Giancarlo Guizzardi 
(2016), I revisited the DOLCE approach to qualities in the 
light of these ideas, proposing a general approach to reifica-
tion and truthmaking according to which qualities are weak 
truth-makers (Parsons  1999) of descriptive properties: it is 
the color of the rose, because of the way it contingently is, 
that makes it true that the rose has a certain color.
In the recent years, BFO has adopted a position7 concern-
ing qualities which is very similar to DOLCE’s: in BFO, the 
color of a rose is a dependent continuant that uniquely in-
heres in the rose, and remains identical to itself throughout 
the rose’s life, while possibly instantiating different determi-
nate universals (like being a red color or a brown color) at 
different times. On the other hand, DOLCE reifies such de-
terminate universals, associating each of them to a region, 
which belongs to a quality space that is characteristic of each 
quality kind. In this way we have two advantages: we are 
able to talk of quality “values” (what we called qualia) since 
they are in the domain of discourse, and we can describe 
the structure of quality spaces. For instance, we can say 
that the red region, in the space of colors, is opposite to the 
green region and close to the brown region. Stefano Borgo 
and Claudio Masolo (2009) have described this approach 
in detail. In conclusion, the ontology of qualities is another 
interesting area where efforts might be joined. I mention 
here some open problems, which in my opinion may be ad-
dressed independently of the philosophical positions of the 
two groups, whose solution may contribute to strengthen 
the applied ontology field.
Local qualities. When we describe extended entities, like a 
vase or a river, we refer to their qualities in different ways. A 
river has (more or less) a definite length, but its width varies 
with the distance from the source, typically getting higher 
towards the end. Similarly, a vase has a definite height, but 
its width may vary. So, at least for certain entities, qual-
ity kinds such as length, height and width don’t behave in 
the same way: length or height just inhere to these objects 
with no need of further qualification, while width requires 
a spatial localization in order to be determined. In my view, 
length and height, in these examples, behave as global quali-
ties, while width behaves as a local quality. A local quality of 
a certain object is a quality which actually inheres to a part 
of that object, but, despite this fact, is somehow considered 
(I would say, from the cognitive point of view) as a qual-
ity of the whole object: so, we rarely say “the width of this 
river stretch is 100 meters,” but we prefer to say “the river’s 
width is 100 meters here.” Analogously, we say “the depth 
of the Adriatic Sea is much higher along the Croatian coast 
than along the Italian coast,” referring to “the sea’s depth” as 
one single entity, although, so to speak, spread out in space. 
Indeed, in many simple cases, we describe the qualitative 
shape of a certain object in terms of the behavior of a local 
spatial quality along a certain dimension. 












Of course, the distinction between global and local quali-
ties is very general, and goes much beyond purely spatial 
qualities. Consider for instance the mass or volume of a 
physical object vs. its density or its temperature, or the dura-
tion of a rain vs. its intensity. In all these cases, we observe 
different ways qualities of things behave with respect to the 
parts of such things. The problem at hand, therefore, is the 
mereological behavior of qualities. Looking at the philosophi-
cal literature, the phenomenon we have described appears to 
be connected to a more general one, concerning the mereo-
logical behavior of properties. A classic distinction in this re-
spect is that between homoeomerous and anomoeomerous 
properties, based on whether or not a property holding for a 
whole also holds for all its parts, and discussed in particular 
by Armstrong (1978). Ingvar Johansson (1989) built on this 
work in the light of the distinction between determinates 
and determinables, focusing his attention to the case of de-
terminate properties belonging to the same determinable, 
and to the ontological nature of patterns like a distribution 
of colored areas on a surface (Johansson 1998). This was, at 
least in my knowledge, one of the few works addressing in 
some detail the mereological behavior of qualities, and not 
just that of generic properties. I have elaborated on these 
ideas in a workshop paper (2013b), but much more should 
be done in this area, which looks very relevant for many 
practical applications.
Relational and quasi-relational qualities. In BFO, relational 
qualities are qualities that have a plurality of independent 
continuants as their bearers. A classic example is a marriage 
bond. In the BFO 2.0 specification, a relational quality is de-
fined as a quality that inheres in two different individuals. 
This violates a very plausible and important principle con-
cerning inherence, present in DOLCE, which says that if x 
inheres in y and x inheres in z, then y=z. This the so-called 
non migration principle, which says that inherence is func-
tional: a quality only inheres in a single thing. A possibility 
to avoid this problem is to assume that a relational quality 
inheres in a mereological sum of continuants, instead of in-
hering separately in both of them. However, I believe that we 
can get rid of relational qualities so defined, and rather adopt 
a general ontological theory of relationships based on ordi-
nary qualities and what I will call—following Moltmann—
quasi-relational qualities.8 A quasi-relational quality is a 
quality that, besides inhering in a single individual, is also 
specifically dependent on a different individual. For exam-
ple, the commitment towards a partner, in a marriage bond, 
can be seen as a quasi-relational quality that inheres in a 
partner and depends on the other one. 
To accommodate this view, we need to give up an axi-
om—built into DOLCE—saying that a quality inheres in 
an individual throughout its life. Clearly this doesn’t hold 
for quasi-relational qualities, since a commitment towards 
a person comes into being only after somebody becomes at 
least acquainted with that person, and may last only for a 
short time. Once we add quasi-relational qualities to ordi-
nary (non-relational) qualities, we have in our hands a pow-
erful tool to account for the nature of (some) relationships, 
which may be seen just as mereological sums of qualities. 
This is the view developed in my recent work with Giancarlo 
Guizzardi (2015; 2016). In this view, a marriage relationship 
is seen as a mereological sum of quasi-relational qualities 
(the mutual commitments), while a comparative relation-
ship, such as the height relationship between a father and 
his son, is just a sum of ordinary qualities: the two heights. 
Note that, despite the fact that the two relations involved in 
these examples (say, married-with and taller-than) have a 
different nature, still it is important for both of them to have 
a clear ontological account for their instances, namely the 
corresponding relationships.9 A practical advantage of see-
ing relationships as sums of qualities is that we can talk of 
them, describing for instance their behavior in time or their 
causal interactions with the world. Note that this picture 
only works for certain kinds of relations, namely those that 
Guizzardi and I called descriptive relations, which hold in 
virtue of some qualities of their relata. Non-descriptive rela-
tions, such as the formal relations of inherence, dependence 
or parthood, just hold between their relata as such, without 
the need for qualities.
In conclusion, coming back to BFO, I don’t think there is 
a need to introduce relational qualities inhering in a plural-
ity of bearers: their respective (ordinary or quasi-relational) 
qualities will do.
Qualities and dispositions. Within specifically dependent 
continuants, BFO makes a sharp distinction between quali-
ties and realizable entities. The former “are fully exhibited or 
manifested or realized” within the entity they inhere in. The 
latter, in contrast, “can inhere without being realized,” and 
“are exhibited only through certain characteristic processes 
of realization.” In turn, a process of realization is defined in 
the present BFO 2.0 specification (Smith 2016) as a process 
which has as participant the bearer of a realizable entity, so 
that it seems to me there is a circularity which should some-
how be fixed.








Anyway, within realizable entities, BFO distinguishes be-
tween roles and dispositions. I will postpone the discussion 
on roles, focusing here on the distinction between qualities 
and dispositions, which I must say I find very confusing. My 
point is that there is a reasonably clear difference between 
dispositional and non-dispositional (so-called categorical) 
properties, but this difference is not reflected, at the onto-
logical level, in a distinction among specifically dependent 
continuants of different kinds.10 In other words, the truth-
maker of the property being fragile seems to be the same as 
the truth-maker of the property having a certain crystalline 
structure. This means that there is a certain quality inhering 
in an object—its crystalline structure—that is responsible for 
a certain conditional behavior. The connection between a 
particular kind of crystalline structure and the correspond-
ing conditional behavior is given by a law of nature, whose 
ontological presuppositions do not require the existence of 
other specifically dependent continuants besides the crystal-
line structure itself. Of course, it may be important, for sci-
entific reasons, to be able to represent such laws of nature, 
but this is not a good reason to introduce an ad hoc ontolog-
ical category. After all, the very fact that the same material 
basis may be responsible of many different dispositions, and 
the difficulty of distinguishing one disposition from another 
(Arp et al. 2016) is a good evidence of their problematic on-
tological status.
Another reason for not postulating a further kind of spe-
cifically dependent continuants besides qualities is that 
many—if not all—ordinary qualities may be described as 
dispositions: colors are an obvious case, but also an individ-
ual mass can be understood as a disposition to maintain a 
body’s velocity, a size as a disposition to pass through holes, 
a happiness as a disposition to interact with people in a cer-
tain way, and so on. Finally, a further reason for being suspi-
cious about dispositions conceived as a genuine ontological 
category is bound to the notion of realization. The possibility 
to participate to certain “characteristic processes” is alleg-
edly reserved only to dispositions, but I would say that all 
ordinary qualities do participate to characteristic processes, 
where they manifest themselves in various ways. For ex-
ample, a body’s temperature may manifest itself in a heating 
process, and a body’s shape may manifest itself in a deforma-
tion process.
In conclusion, I believe that it is enough, for our purposes, 
to admit qualities of different degrees of complexity: there 
are simple qualities like mass or length, more complex quali-
ties like color or taste, and very complex qualities like fragil-
ity. Complex qualities are specifically dependent on simpler 
qualities. Each of these qualities can be described in a dispo-
sitional or non-dispositional way.
Roles. Given the semi-personal nature of this essay, let me 
say that I have been always obsessed by roles. One of my ear-
liest papers in knowledge representation is entitled “What’s 
in a role?” (1990), and yet I confess that I don’t have a fully 
satisfactory answer to this question, although I have certain-
ly learned a lot since then. I have been always fascinated by 
the subtle aspects of this notion, and by its ubiquitous rel-
evance for practical applications. Yet, differently from dispo-
sitions, roles haven’t been much considered in the analytic 
ontology literature, while of course they have been studied 
by linguistics and sociology, and play a prominent role (al-
low me the pun) in applied ontology.
It is not a surprise therefore to see roles appearing in 
BFO, but their characterization as realizable specifically-de-
pendent continuants reflects a very peculiar understanding 
of the role notion which, although useful, would require a 
broader framework. Let me first clarify some terminological 
issues. In the past (2009; 2000), I have always used the term 
‘role’ to refer to anti-rigid externally-dependent properties. 
However, I acknowledge it makes sense to reserve this term 
to particulars, so I agree with the distinction between roles 
and role-related defined classes (role properties) adopted in 
BFO (Arp et al. 2016). Of course, we have to clarify what 
kind of particulars we are talking of. In this respect, a use-
ful analysis of different kinds of roles has been proposed by 
Frank Loebe (2007), who distinguishes among three role 
types: relational roles, processual roles, and social roles. Now, I 
think that BFO roles may be adequate to represent relational 
roles, but fall short of accounting for processual roles and so-
cial roles. Let me informally discuss the three cases, present-
ing a view which is slightly different from that discussed by 
Loebe, and is still largely work in progress.
Relational roles are those aspects of an entity that are actu-
ally involved in a relationship. In a love relationship between 
John and Mary, John’s love towards Mary is the role he has. 
Describing his role in the relationship means describing his 
love (which may change in time). Such love inheres in John 
and is externally dependent on Mary, so it is an externally 
dependent continuant, that is, a BFO role. The actual role of 
a doctor in a treatment relationship with a patient is again 
a (complex) externally dependent continuant, including his 
actual competencies, commitment, and so on. According to 
the discussion above, the treatment relationship itself is the 
mereological sum of the doctor’s (relational) role and the 
patient’s (relational) role. Note that ‘externally dependent 












continuant’ is just a synonym of what I have called ‘quasi-
relational quality’ in the above discussion on relationships.
Processual roles are defined by Loebe as ‘slices’ of pro-
cesses with respect to the dimension of participants. Using 
his example, when John moves his pen, he and the pen are 
the participants to that process, and the processual role John 
has in the process captures what John does in that partici-
pation (“Thinking of a mime who moves an imaginary pen 
should be a good illustration of the notion of a processual 
role.”) Clearly, processual roles are not externally dependent 
continuants, so they do not fall under the category of BFO 
roles. Yet, a great practical relevance have the various kinds 
of processual roles (not mentioned by Loebe), which in my 
opinion correspond exactly to what in linguistics are called 
thematic roles: ways of participation in a process (or an 
event). Classic examples are agent, patient, instrument, and 
so on. A continuant is the agent of a process (that is, it has 
the agent role-property) if and only if its participation in that 
process (i.e., its processual role) is of the kind agent.
Finally, social roles11 differ in my opinion from the previ-
ous cases since they are conventional behaviors (so, behavior 
kinds) reflecting social expectations or intentional goals. The 
etymology of ‘role’ is illuminating in this respect: the term 
comes from the French rôle, which in turn comes from the 
old French rolle, used to denote the roll (of paper) on which 
an actor’s part was written. So, we can assume that behind 
each social role there is an (implicit or explicit) role descrip-
tion stating certain behavioral rules. Having a social role 
means being expected or being wanted to comply to such 
rules. The distinction between wanted and expected behav-
iors marks a radical difference between social roles, which 
I have discussed in some detail in a paper (2013a) on func-
tional roles and replaceability in the light of Anscombe’s 
(and Searle’s) notion of direction of fit (Anscombe  1957). 
To put it shortly, there is a difference between the customer 
role and the employee role: the former’s behavior is expected, 
while the latter’s is wanted. A striking consequence of this 
difference is that you can replace an employee, but you can’t 
replace a customer (you can get another customer, or change 
your customer, but—at least in the ordinary way of speak-
ing—you don’t replace customers). A further linguistic evi-
dence is that only for wanted roles12 we can properly say that 
they are played: it makes perfect sense to play the employee 
role, but it is a bit strange to play the customer role or the 
friend role. This is the reason why previously I emphasized 
the fact that things do not play relational or processual roles, 
but they just have those roles.
Going back to BFO roles, it is clear that, being specifically-
dependent externally-grounded continuants (that is, quasi-
relational qualities), they are very similar to the relational 
roles I have discussed above. The difference is that they are 
assumed as being realizable entities, while this notion of re-
alizability is not present (or at least not necessary) for rela-
tional roles, and seems to be somehow related to social roles, 
which presuppose the realization of an expected or wanted 
behavior. However, social roles, in the way I defined them, 
cannot inhere in continuants, simply because they are not 
particulars, but universals (behavior kinds). Of course, hav-
ing a social role implies having a number of quasi-relational 
qualities (such as commitments, claims, duties, and expec-
tations) but these are not social roles in the ordinary sense: 
they are rather relational roles, whose manifestations (the 
actual behavior) may or not be in agreement with the expect-
ed or wanted behavior. In conclusion, it seems that BFO can 
only account for a notion that is related to the ordinary no-
tion of social role, namely the actual attitude/commitment/
disposition to exhibit a social behavior, but is not a social 
role in the ordinary sense.13 Indeed, only for social roles, but 
not for the other roles, it makes sense (and is relevant) to 
express the distance between an actual relational behaviour 
and the expected or wanted behavior characteristic of a giv-
en social role. This distance is usually expressed by a compli-
ance relationship.
2.3 SNAP and SPAN
While concluding this essay,14 which has given me a nice 
opportunity to better understand Barry’s philosophical po-
sitions and practical motivations, I cannot avoid mention-
ing one of the aspects of BFO that mostly puzzles me: the 
choice to consider objects and processes as alternative ways 
of describing reality, and not as complementary aspects of 
the same reality. Fortunately, it seems to me that this choice 
is more a concern of theå old philosopher than a preoc-
cupation of the present applied ontologist, and has almost 
disappeared now: while participation was presented as a 
“trans-ontological relation” by Grenon and Smith (2004), 
in the present BFO 2.0 specification it appears as an ordi-
nary relation. Indeed, without seeing objects and processes 
as parts of the same ontology, it would have been difficult 
to define realizable entities in terms of realized processes of 
certain kind.
A further, subtler evidence of the unavoidable entangle-
ment of objects and processes lies in the choice (in practice, 
the need) to distinguish among multiple processes occurring 
in the same space-time. In deciding about SNAP and SPAN, 








Barry Smith drew on an intuition of Zemach that “a spatio-
temporal world can be cut in several radically different ways” 
(Zemach 1970). However, as clarified in the BFO 2.0 speci-
fication, “where events, for Zemach, are identified with the 
entire contents of some given spatiotemporal region, BFO 
allows that the same spatiotemporal region may be occupied 
by multiple different processes (as for example your running 
process and your simultaneous process of getting warmer)” 
(Smith 2016, p. 16). But how would these different pro-
cesses be isolated from the global process occurring in that 
spatiotemporal region? The boundaries of a spatiotemporal 
region are very reasonable individuation criteria for ‘global’ 
processes, but if we want a more fine-grained granularity we 
need to adopt suitable criteria to distinguish a running pro-
cess from a warming process. A natural way to do this is to 
consider processes as manifestations of qualities inhering in 
continuants: for example, a warming process is a manifesta-
tion of a temperature quality inhering in a particular con-
tinuant. So, being able to isolate a warming process from a 
global process occurring in a spatiotemporal region requires 
being able to focus (Guarino and Guizzardi 2016) on such 
specific quality and continuant. But this requires an ontol-
ogy that admits continuants and occurrents as parts of the 
same reality.
I think that this idea of processes as manifestation of qual-
ities (or, vice-versa, as qualities as the focus of processes) 
is something that can hopefully inspire, together with the 
other suggestions I made in this paper, for the various foun-
dational ontologies (such as DOLCE, BFO, GFO, and UFO) 
that are more or less based on the Aristotelian square and 
on Lowe’s four-category ontology. I am convinced that Barry 
and I can agree on a common core, and I really hope we can 
mutually understand the different reasons for extending 
such core in different directions.
NOTES
1 Despite this, I am still a proud engineer, especially since 
I am more interested in finding solutions than finding 
problems (supposedly the key difference between 
philosophers and engineers). That’s why, while being 
enormously grateful to philosophy for helping me 
to understand problems, I tend to be very agnostic 
towards deep metaphysical positions, picking up in a 
very eclectic way just what I need to find solutions that 
work enough.
2 In retrospect, the position I defended then was very 
much similar to the one advocated by Barry with his 
criticism of “fantology” (Smith 2005).
3 The first version of BFO was published in the DOLCE 
deliverable (Masolo, Borgo, Gangemi, Guarino, and 
Oltramari 2003).
4 Most notably, in a workshop on applied ontology 
organized by Jonathan Lowe in May 2013, shortly 
before his early departure.
5 Amounts of matter seem to be absent in BFO. There is a 
notion of ‘object aggregate’ (say, a collection of bricks), 
but—as far as I understand—if this collection of bricks 
forms a house, the relationship between the house and 
the collection of bricks (which would be a constitution 
relation in DOLCE), is not analysed in BFO.
6 The BFO 2.0 specification (Smith 2016) defines a site as 
“a three-dimensional immaterial entity that is (partially 
or wholly) bounded by a material entity or it is a 
three-dimensional immaterial part thereof.” I wonder 
whether all immaterial entities included within the 
convex hull of a material object but not being part of it 
would count as sites. For instance, is the space between 
your neck and your shoulder a site? 
7 This position is clearly documented in the BFO V2.0 
specification. Previously it was less clear, and on several 
occasions I had the feeling that BFO qualities were 
super-determinate tropes. For instance, “the particular 
case of redness of a particular fly eye” example is taken 
from a lecture on “Towards a Standard Upper Level 
Ontology” given by Barry Smith in September 2011. In 
any case, I am glad for the convergence now.
8 In the past, I have often used the term relational 
qualities to denote what I now call quasi-relational 
qualities.












9 So I disagree with the view adopted by BFO that 
comparative relationships are not entities in their own 
right (Arp, Smith, and Spear 2016).
10 As far as I understand, this is the position held by 
Mumford in his book on dispositions (1998).
11 I refer here to social roles in the strict sense, not in the 
very general sense discussed in (Masolo et al. 2004).
12 It seems to me that all wanted roles are functional roles, 
but I will not touch this aspect here.
13 I must add however that even this interpretation 
of BFO roles is problematic, since their definition 
prescribes that a role “is not such that, if it ceases to 
exist, then the physical make-up of the bearer is thereby 
changed” (Smith 2016, p. 57). I think that, especially for 
social roles, the corresponding attitudes/commitments/
dispositions are not independent from the physical 
make-up of their bearer. For instance, the commitment 
to realize a student role of course requires some 
changes in the brain’s “make-up” of its bearer. I would 
say that, in general, active role-properties (being the 
lover of Mary) presuppose some (non-essential) change 
in the physical make-up of their role bearers, while this 
is not required for passive roles (being loved by John).
14 I am thankful to Giancarlo Guizzardi for his useful 
comments on a previous draft of this paper.
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